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Abstract
This paper addresses the limitations of Modern Money Theory (MMT) as a guide to development pol-
icy. We explore two central questions on this topic: whether MMT policies 1) ought to be implemented
in low- and middle-income economies and 2) can be implemented. In relation to the first question, we
argue that the MMT literature mischaracterizes the essence of the development challenge for low- and
middle-income economies. Our argument is that the chief long-run growth challenge faced by devel-
oping countries concerns structural transformation rather than general aggregate demand insufficiency.
We use several formal representations of the consumption-investment trade-off in growth theory, found
in the Harrod-Domar growth model, Kalecki’s 1963 growth model, and Feldman-Mahalanobis model,
to illustrate this point. Concerning the second question, we argue that even if MMT had the correct
diagnosis of the principal growth challenge faced by developing countries, its chief policy recommen-
dations would likely be counter-productive if implemented outside of select advanced economies. We
draw from the international economics literature on currency hierarchy and exchange rate volatility to
illustrate this point.
Key Words: MMT, structural change, macro policy, growth models, history of economic thought.
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1 Introduction
Modern Money Theory (MMT) has recently generated considerable discussion. MMT has a growing
following thanks to the brilliant success of its chief proponents in popularizing the theory, but much
of the recent attention has been critical (Epstein 2019, Rogoff 2019, Summers 2019). While a signifi-
cant amount of this attention has focused on MMT’s applicability in advanced economies, particularly
in the United States, critical engagement with questions over the applicability of MMT-inspired poli-
cies in developing economies has been more limited. Since MMT is now garnering more attention in
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developing countries, amidst crises of legitimacy for orthodox macroeconomic policy (countries like
South Africa and Turkey are a case in point), the need for formal criticisms of the MMT framework
is becoming increasingly relevant. This is not to say that criticism of orthodoxy is unwelcome. Un-
fortunately, however, the wide applicability of MMT is often too simply assumed, and its academic
advocates have made little attempt to qualify the approach’s domain of applicability. The COVID-19
economic shock has amplified our concerns with these developments, as debt-monetization under the
rubric of quantitative easing has appeared to be more appealing to policy-makers in a period where
the prospects for tax financing are diminished by the collapse of incomes, while the ‘flight to safety’
dampens foreign demand for government bonds.
This paper addresses the limitations of MMT-inspired policies in developing countries. Firstly, we
argue that the MMT approach mischaracterizes the essence of the economic development challenge
for low- and middle-income countries. Our argument is that the long-run growth challenge faced by
developing countries concerns structural transformation rather than general aggregate demand insuffi-
ciency. Secondly, we argue that even if MMT had the correct diagnosis of the principal growth chal-
lenge faced by developing countries, the chief policy recommendations emphasized by MMT might
be counter-productive if implemented outside of select advanced economies. While the second point
is made by some scholars in recent years, including Vergnhanini and De Conti (2017), Vernengo and
Caldentey (2019), and Bonizzi et al. (2019), the mischaracterization of the main economic develop-
ment challenges by MMT has not received enough attention, aside from Skott (2019). The two issues
we address in this paper reduce to whether MMT-policy 1) ought to be implemented in low- and
middle-income economies and 2) can be implemented.
One of the main concepts we use in this paper to examine the desirability of MMT-inspired policies’
is the consumption-investment trade-off, which stresses the idea that making room for investment in
capital-scarce economies involves sacrificing present for future consumption. This concept has long
been illustrated in a series of contributions to the development literature, including in the Harrod-
Domar growth model, Kalecki (1963), Feldman/Mahalanobis model, and a more recent Harrodian
representation in Skott (2019). Using the common theme to these papers, we argue that MMT advo-
cates fail to consider the implication of their proposals for the composition of national output between
consumption and investment. For economies suffering from a structural aggregate demand deficiency,
standard counter-cyclical policies to stimulate present consumption and pursue full employment are
desirable. However, for economies that require prolonged periods of rapid capital accumulation to at-
tain higher future living standards, curtailing current consumption is needed to create space for a high
investment share of output. This need begets serious political economy questions for growth strategy
in developing countries, where inequalities and absolute poverty are often pronounced. In this paper,
we illustrate that MMT advocates’ writings on developing countries show a lack of appreciation for
these previously well-recognized points in development discourse.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief summary of MMT’s
theoretical underpinnings as well as its main policy proposals in the context of developing countries.
Section three discusses the mischaracterization of development issues by MMT advocates. Section
four addresses the limits to MMT-policies given the current international macroeconomic and financial
context. Section five presents the formalizations of consumption-investment trade-off. Section six
concludes.
2 A Brief Overview of MMT
MMT advocates often complain about the mischaracterization of their theoretical framework by crit-
ics1. In this section, we will attempt to summarize MMT’s core principles by drawing on the original
writings of MMT authors. MMT, in significant part, builds on insights from Abba Lerner’s work on
‘functional finance,’ which concludes that governments should set their fiscal position at a level con-
sistent with ‘functionally’ defined outcomes such as price stability and full employment (Lerner 1943:
41). As such, MMT advocates setting the primary target of fiscal (and monetary) policy as maintaining
full employment without excessive inflation.
The MMT approach also depends on neo-chartalism2, which suggests that countries that issue sovereign
currency do not need to levy taxes to pay for government expenditures (Wray 2015: 48). While there
are some variations3, the definitions of monetary sovereignty by MMT scholars share the following
features: a country is said to have sovereign currency if (1) the domestic currency is the unit of ac-
count, (2) taxes and government expenditures are paid, and debts are issued in this domestic currency,
and (3) the currency is floating and non-convertible4 (Wray 2015: 41-45). Under neo-chartalism, the
government spends its currency into existence, which taxpayers use to pay their tax obligations (ibid.).
MMT suggests that households require the government to spend so that they can fulfil their tax obli-
gations rather than governments needing the tax revenue to spend. In other words, according to MMT,
the primary purpose of taxation is to “drive” the use of currency rather than provide revenue for gov-
ernment expenditures (ibid.: 278). Hence, currency issuance and tax imposition ensure widespread
domestic use and acceptance of the currency5.
1See, for example, Nersisyan and Wray (2020)
2See Mehrling (2000) for a critical discussion of chartalism.
3For instance, Kelton (2020) adopts the ‘spectrum of monetary sovereignty view,’ which sees monetary sovereignty as a
continuum with some nations having a high degree of sovereignty and others having less, little, or none. See Bonizzi et
al. (2019) for a summary of the differences among MMT advocates regarding their views on the spectrum view.
4Non-convertibility in this context means that the government does not promise to convert the domestic currency into
something that they could run out, such as gold.
5Incidentally, this perspective on the role of taxation might be particularly persuasive when considering the history of
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Following these ideas, MMT argues that a sovereign government cannot become insolvent in its own
currency (Wray 2015: 286, Fazi & Mitchell 2019). In other words, it cannot be forced into involuntary
defaults on its obligations denominated in its currency. This implies that a sovereign government can
‘afford’ to purchase anything for sale, including labor, insofar as it is priced in its currency (Wray
2015: xi).
With regard to policy advice, MMT advocates an expansion in government spending when total spend-
ing in an economy is too low and an increase in taxes when there is a need to damp down the economy
to prevent excess inflation. Concerning monetary policy, MMT recommends keeping interest rates
very low in the long run. Since a government with a sovereign currency cannot default on the payment
of a debt denominated in its currency, the international markets, MMT advocates argue, will not doubt
their payment capacity. As such, MMT contends that countries with a sovereign currency are free of
any market constraints in its policymaking; the only constraints are political and self-imposed (Wray
1998: 75).
Concerning open economy issues, MMT proposes the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime
as a way of relaxing constraints on the ability of developing countries to implement MMT-policies
(Wray 2015, Kaboub 2007). MMT suggests that as much as a country can afford purchasing goods
priced in its currency, it can also purchase foreign currency by offering up its currency in exchange.
Therefore, the adoption of a flexible exchange rate regime constitutes one of the requirements for
monetary sovereignty and, hence, MMT’s applicability. Although some MMT scholars, such as Wray
(2015: 286), acknowledge that there might be limits to this6, these limits are paradoxically overlooked
by MMT scholars that have a developing country focus. For instance, Fadhel Kaboub, described by
some as the leading development-oriented MMT scholar, in discussing open economy constraints in
the Tunisian economy, argues that:
“If the Tunisian government adopts a flexible exchange rate regime and allows free convertibility
of the TND [Tunisian Dinar] in international exchange markets, then Tunisia can practically
import anything it wants by simply offering to exchange TNDs for whatever other currency
is required for that purchase. There will always be a demand for TNDs, albeit at a devalued
exchange rate.” (Kaboub 2007: 24)
capitalist development in many developing countries, particularly former colonies. See Arrighi (1970: 208) for a comment
on the role of hut and poll taxes in stimulating proletarianization in Rhodesia. In-kind payment was initially accepted but
later discouraged to induce the payment of tax through wage employment. See Bundy (1972) for discussion on the South
African case.
6Wray states “It [a sovereign government that issues its own “nonconvertible” currency] might be able to buy things for
sale in foreign currency by offering up its own currency in exchange – but that is not certain” (emphasis added)
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MMT’s treatment of the trade balance stands out from most conventional analyses in the literature.
MMT views imports as a benefit and exports as a cost in ‘real’ terms (Mitchell et al. 2019). Ac-
cordingly, while exporting nations bear the cost of producing the output and not getting the benefit,
importing countries enjoy obtaining the output that they did not have to produce. It is for this reason
that net exports are viewed as net costs, while net imports are seen as net benefits (Wray 2015: 218).
As Bonizzi et al. (2019: 48) note, this interpretation only considers the immediate benefits of increased
current consumption and accumulation of physical capital, accompanied by a larger trade deficit while
ignoring its implications on the longer-run accumulation of cross-border financial positions.
MMT advocates for the state fulfilling a role as Employer of Last Resort (ELR) as a means to achieve
the full employment objective. The ELR is a proposal for a government-funded program whereby the
government employs all unemployed labor who are ready, willing, and able to work in a public sector
project at a basic wage rate (Tcherneva 2012; Kaboub 2012: 307). In this way, governments can in-
troduce a mechanism to respond to business cycle fluctuations by absorbing excess labor supply when
the private sector downsizes and can release workers when the economy is booming7. The end target
of an ELR program is to achieve full employment at all stages of the business cycle.
Building on MMT’s central premise that governments that issue sovereign currencies are not financially
constrained, ELR advocates argue that there is always the financial capacity to pay for ELR programs
(Kaboub 2007: 4, Tcherneva 2012). Wray (2015: 217) notes that since most developing nations have
a sovereign currency, they can ‘afford’ to buy whatever is for sale in the domestic currency, including
unemployed labor 8.
3 Misdiagnosis of the Problem
The main problem with an MMT approach to development challenges in a low-income or middle-
income economy concerns the diagnostic aspect. The MMT approach, in general, seems geared to-
ward managing either the issues of short-run stabilization or ‘secular stagnation.’ That is, this approach
is suited toward managing downturns in business cycles or long-run aggregate demand insufficiency.
But this is not sufficient to drive economic development and structural change, which has significant
long-run and supply-side dimensions.
7The ELR advocates argue that, besides helping to achieve the full-employment target, the ELR comes with other benefits,
stabilizing effects on wages and prices, creation of socially useful infrastructure, the ability to address different forms of
discriminations, and effectiveness in poverty reduction (Tcherneva 2012).
8Wray also suggests that international aid in the form of foreign currency could be welcome in the financing of ELR
programs, particularly if the poverty-reducing impacts of the ELR increase imports. However, Wray advises against
building up foreign currency indebtedness, as it could be challenging to service it.
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Another reason why MMT’s relevance to the specific problems faced by developing countries is limited
is that MMT does not pay enough attention to the constraints that have historically hindered develop-
ment policy. Where the literature on late industrialization has typically focused on industrial and trade
policies, MMT’s domain of relevance is strictly fiscal and monetary. This would be less surprising if
there were a significant economics tradition that highlighted the centrality of general aggregate demand
stimulus to drive development. Instead, there is a long tradition of macroeconomic theory, going back
to authors like Rao (1952) and Chakravarty (1979), which has stressed the inapplicability of Keynesian
policies as a lever for driving the development process.
The problems with MMT’s diagnostic of development issue is well illustrated by the notion that the
ELR can be meaningfully implemented in countries with vast reserves of hidden or observable unem-
ployment. In essence, the application of MMT-inspired policies to developing countries amounts to a
crude conflation of ‘Keynesian unemployment’ with ‘Marxian unemployment.’ To develop this point,
it is worth stressing how classical development theory and some significant post-Keynesian macro
theorists have characterized the underdevelopment challenge. From its early stages in the 1950s, de-
velopment economics sought to highlight two structural features of developing economies: surplus
labor/hidden unemployment and capital goods insufficiency. These two features are linked – it was
argued that through a process of rapid capital accumulation, surplus labor can be absorbed, and a de-
veloping economy can approach maturity. The development problem and issue of unemployment in
developing countries then, as post-Keynesian theorists such as Joan Robinson put it, is not a problem
of deficiency of effective demand, but a deficiency in the acquisition of capital goods:
“Keynesian remedies can be effective as a solution to a problem of under-utilization of capacity,
but it is evident that they cannot create a capacity that doesn’t already exist” [Quoted from Lavoie
2014: 278].
Robinson was not the only eminent post-Keynesian to adopt this position. Michal Kalecki was sim-
ilarly dismissive of the idea that the problem of underdevelopment was one of deficient effective de-
mand:
“The problem of unemployment in underdeveloped countries differs fundamentally from that in
developed economies. In the latter, unemployment arises on account of inadequacy of effective
demand. During periods of depression unemployed labor coexists with underutilized equipment.
The situation may, therefore, be tackled by measures designed to stimulate effective demand,
such as loan financed government expenditure. Unemployment and underemployment in under-
developed countries are of an entirely different nature. They result from the shortage of capital
equipment rather than from deficiency of effective demand.” (Kalecki 1960: 3)
These two quotes highlight the importance, both for Robinson and Kalecki, of the difference between
‘Keynesian’ and ‘Marxian’ unemployment. In the early stages of economic development, ‘the reserve
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army of the unemployed’ or ‘surplus labor’ exerts downward pressure on wages. This helps capitalists
to generate high profits, which can be used for capital accumulation. As the pace of accumulation
accelerates, capital accumulation outpaces the growth in the labor force, which builds excess capacity
into the economy. Once the existing stock of capital rises above a level that is more than sufficient
to employ the available labor, unemployment becomes ‘Keynesian’ in the sense that it is associated
with the insufficiency of effective demand, which can be addressed by expanding government expen-
ditures. On the other hand, approaching the matter from a somewhat stylized perspective, addressing
unemployment in developing economies requires an increase in the size of the capital stock to a level
sufficient to employ the available labor. In other words, raising employment and living standards in
developing economies necessitates an increase in productive capacity via high levels of investment
(Kriesler 2012).
Kalecki argued that in developing nations, the attempt to secure full employment could easily lead to
inflationary tendencies if the productive capacity is not improved (Sawyer 2007)9. He discussed this
possibility through his ‘forced savings’ argument, addressing the effect of aggregate demand stimulus
in the context of inelastic wage-goods supply. This perspective was highlighted by Thomas Palley in
the context of a discussion with MMT advocates regarding the economic rationale for South Africa’s
Expanded Public Works Program (EPWP). Palley argued that a job guarantee was likely to have com-
plex political ramifications if it stimulated demand for wage-goods when the South African economy
did not have the capacity to produce more of these wage goods10. He argued that this would stimulate
wage-goods inflation and hence lower the real-wages of private and public sector workers who were
not direct beneficiaries of EPWP jobs. As far as we can tell, MMT advocates have not put forward
compelling responses to these classical criticisms of simplistic transplantation of macro policy ideas
from advanced economies to low-income and emerging market economies. This has led to the proposal
of treating significant reserves of hidden and visible unemployment as absorbable through the public
sector – a proposal which, in the many low- and middle-income countries affected by this issue, entails
growing the government share of output to a degree seemingly unappreciated by the advocates of this
9Some MMT scholars acknowledge the real constraints to increasing government expenditures. For instance, Kelton (2020)
notes that “[j]ust because there are no financial constraints on the federal budget doesn’t mean there aren’t real limits to
what the government can (and should) do. Every economy has its own internal speed limit, regulated by the availability of
our real productive resources–the state of technology and the quantity and quality of its land, workers, factories, machines,
and other materials. If the government tries to spend too much into an economy that’s already running at full speed,
inflation will accelerate.” (emphasis in the original). While Kelton’s analysis is incomplete, insofar as it glosses over the
political economy constraints of overcoming the institutional barriers to increasing the supply of wage goods and food, it
is nonetheless an important step forward for some MMT advocates to acknowledge that there could be real constraints to
increasing government expenditures. We find it puzzling that more development-oriented MMT scholars, such as Kaboub,
overlook these constraints.
10https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wH-lnn1mICA&feature=youtu.be&t=1m3s.
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proposal. In the paragraphs below we address the desirability and feasibility of this suggestion.
The policy advocacy of leading MMT scholar Bill Mitchell provides an illustrative example. For
Mitchell, the notion that South Africa’s high rate of (visible) unemployment, over 30 percent by broad
definition, is structural in nature is wrong. “By any standards, the unemployment problem in South
Africa is what economists call a demand deficiency situation rather than a structural problem.” Fur-
ther, solving the problem is simple: “The solution to South Africa’s unemployment problem is to
generate more work” (King-Dejardin & Santos 2009: 115). In other words, the scourge of un- and
under-employment can easily be addressed by ELR programs. This is not how expanded public works
programs (EPWP) have been understood in South Africa. As a leading South African labor mar-
ket specialist has put it: ‘Unlike [African National Congress] politicians and sundry hacks, EPWP
management is . . . usually at pains to dispel the perception that the EPWP is a “panacea” for “the
unemployment problem of the country”’ (Meth 2011: 6).
Moreover, for Mitchell (2012), the use of ELR programs in developing countries like South Africa
constitutes a development strategy insofar as it “can serve [as] an industry policy to promote a quick-
ening of this move to a high-wage, high productivity economy by placing pressure on market economy
employers through the wage floor it establishes.” Yes, “some employers would close their operations
because they would not be able to operate at the higher costs. . . [but] economic development always
involves a movement from lower productivity-higher cost production to higher productivity-lower cost
production”11. It is hard to situate Mitchell’s proposals within established development theory – in fact,
this approach seems almost specially disposed to bringing about a situation of ‘pre-mature maturity’,
impeding the developmental use of duality. That is to say, where the wage premium plays an important
role in spurring the growth of the high productivity sector in classical development theory (like the
Lewis model), Mitchell’s approach spectacularly flips the script by attempting to drive the transition
to a high-productivity economy through collapsing the wage-premium and seemingly at a high cost
to the low-productivity sector. This cavalier attitude toward policies that put firms out of operation
is concerning considering it is advocated in contexts with already high unemployment and where the
informal sector employment is often crucial for keeping heightened rates of absolute poverty at bay12.
While Mitchell fails to recognize the nature of unemployment in developing countries characterized
by vast reserves of hidden or visible unemployment, Wray (2015) notes two challenges to implement
11http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=19981
12The low-productivity sector is bound to have higher rates of exploitative practices than the high-productivity and clearly
it will be ideal to transition to greater rates of formal sector activity from both the social and economic standpoints. But
there are major qualitative differences between achieving a high share of formal sector employment through: 1) growing
the formal sector versus 2) through decimating the informal sector.
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ELR programs in these countries13. First, he notes that small developing nations may produce a small
range of commodities and import a large number of types of goods they do not produce. Secondly,
he acknowledges the significant sectoral disparities characterizing these economies, whereby a small
formal sector coexists with a large informal sector that generates most of the production and employ-
ment. He argues that if implemented under these conditions, the introduction of an ELR program
would likely trigger a flood of workers from the informal sector towards the ELR jobs. This would
bring about a significant increase in monetary incomes and demand for consumption goods, resulting
in deterioration of the trade balance and quick loss of international reserves. These dynamics, Wray
argues, would likely result in an exchange rate and economic crisis.
As a remedy to these challenges, Wray suggests that an ELR program in a developing nation would
need to keep the program’s wage close to the average wage earned in the informal sector. For Wray,
the poverty-reducing capacity of the program could still be maintained by including a compensation
package into ELR programs that would provide some necessities including domestically produced food
items, clothing, shelter, and some essential services such as healthcare, childcare, and education. He
argues that the in-kind nature of these transfers will decrease the chance that monetary income substi-
tute imports for domestic production. Nevertheless, wage income the ELR provides and the provision
of necessities will generate a net positive impact on aggregate demand, which would create pressure on
the trade balance. This pressure will be intensified if production by ELR programs requires imports of
capital equipment. Wray suggests that careful planning by government, such as linking the provision
of imports to export earnings or international aid, can help address these undesired impacts.
To assess these proposals, it is important to scrutinize the nature of obstacles to stepping up invest-
ment, given that the lack of productive capital is the major factor driving structural unemployment in
developing nations. Kalecki (1966) discusses three major obstacles in this respect: (1) private invest-
ment may not be upcoming at an adequate rate due to lack of incentives, (2) there may be bottlenecks
in physical resources to produce more investment goods, (3) there may be a problem of inadequate
supply of necessities to cover the rising demand resulting from the increase in employment. Without
formulating policies aimed at expanding the industrial sector through incentives and provision of the
capital goods required to enhance capital accumulation, it is hard to see how Wray’s alterations to the
ELR program can address these obstacles, particularly the first two.
One of the few MMT scholars to have made contributions to the development literature is Jan Kregel.
Kregel (2016) has been relatively clear in recognition that MMT must respond to questions regarding
the existence of supply-side constraints if it is to engage meaningfully about the applicability of the
13Wray also argues that the limited administrative capacity of governments in developing nations could pose challenges for
the implementation of ELP programs. We do not focus on this argument in this paper.
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framework in developing countries. The problem of rigid wage-goods supply is one manifestation
of these supply-side constraints, but development theory has also long emphasized the significance
of savings constraints. While Kregel takes an important step vis-a`-vis other MMT counterparts in
recognizing this issue, it is unclear that he either incorporates or refutes relevant contributions in the
development literature. He argues that most developing countries are not plagued by scarce resources,
since they are labor and commodity rich, as if this sufficiently addresses the supply-constraint argu-
ment, which highlights the insufficiency of capital as opposed to labor, or as if classical development
theory has been unaware of these points.
Furthermore, while Kregel may be correct to raise doubts about the ability to finance development
externally through capital inflows, it is unclear whether this criticism can be levied against what he
calls as the ‘supply-side approach’ in general. It is in one fell swoop that Kregel jumps from criticizing
Domar’s position on the relevance of external finance for development to arguing that the problems of
this approach imply the need for a demand-centred MMT-led approach to mobilizing domestic finance.
Kregel (2016: 515) argues that:
“[l]ike Keynes’s theory, this approach was formulated with developed countries in mind, as an
argument to support the use of Keynesian expenditure policies to produce full utilisation of pro-
ductive capacity and full employment. But it seems to be just as applicable to developing coun-
tries with the appropriate adaptations noted above with respect to the appropriation of Keynes’s
theory of effective demand and disguised unemployment”.
To his credit, Kregel does not seem to argue for addressing development issues primarily through gen-
eral aggregate demand policy of the MMT variety: he, rightfully in our view, highlights the importance
of the exchange rate as a key policy variable under the rubric of ‘New Developmentalism’, and in the
context of the role for the manufacturing sector as an engine for development. He also highlights the
need for controls on foreign capital flows14. Unfortunately, it is hard to situate these arguments within
the broader thrust of the piece and the argument in favor of MMT-led development is left underdevel-
14Some MMT advocates mention capital controls as an important tool that can be used to increase monetary sovereignty;
however, as Epstein (2019) notes, the treatment of this issue in the MMT literature is minimal. For instance, capital
controls receive one-page space in the most recently published MMT textbook, Mitchell et al. (2019: 30). While Mitchell
advocates more strongly for capital controls in his blog, MMT scholars do not discuss in any sufficient detail the details
and institutional specificity of capital controls that are required to enhance nations’ monetary sovereignty. As another
example, the only mention of capital controls we could find in Kaboub’s work on ELR is the following statement:
“The proposed strategy [referring to ELR] ... require flexible exchange rates, currency convertibility, capital controls...”.
Kaboub does not expand on this in the rest of the paper. Finally, MMT’s treatment of capital controls is not free of
contradictions. For instance, while Wray (2015) states that capital controls might be needed to provide developing
countries with more sovereignty, he also argues that relaxing capital controls could also be desirable insofar as it allows
a nation to enjoy more benefits (imports) and fewer costs (exports).
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oped.
Other MMT scholars, like Tymoigne and Wray (2013), in responding to critics like Palley on the do-
main of applicability of MMT, have stressed that the only constraints on developing countries with
regard to implementing MMT policy concerns whether developing countries choose to take debt in a
foreign currency (commit the ‘original sin’) or if they choose to peg the currency. As addressed in
more detail below, these comments show a lack of appreciation for the policy bind commonly faced by
developing countries.
If one of the main targets of a long-term development program is to increase capital accumulation,
there should be incentives for firms in the industrial sector to carry out the required investment. In cap-
ital constrained economies, besides creating incentives, economic policy should also focus on creating
resources for sustained capital accumulation. In our view, one of the most socially desirable ways of
creating resources would be to reduce luxury consumption by high-income earners through taxation.
While some MMT scholars, such as Wray (2015) consider the importance of curtailing luxury con-
sumption, this view is in stark contrast with other MMT authors’ attitude towards distributional issues,
such as Kelton (2019) and Kaboub (2007)15. Kaboub argues that under a floating exchange rate regime
with convertible currency, individuals who can afford luxury goods should be free to pursue their con-
sumption. We believe that MMT’s advocacy on the basis that it offers Pareto Optimal free lunches is
concerning because it overlooks the importance of resource allocation to ‘finance’ capital accumula-
tion. Also, this criterion abstracts from other desiderate of an allocation. Distributional conflict is, in
our view, central to processes of economic development16.
4 Challenges to MMT in the International Macroeconomics Context
Much of the MMT literature views external constraints on policy choices as being self-imposed. Al-
though some MMT scholars recognize the limitations on monetary sovereignty, MMT’s policy propos-
als for developing nations, in general, downplay binding external constraints (Bonizzi et al. 2019: 53).
The international currency hierarchy literature and the concept of ‘Original Sin’ provide a relevant
starting place to examine the extent to which developing countries possess ‘monetary sovereignty’.
15Kelton makes contradictory statements regarding the role of taxation. In a Bloomberg opinion piece entitled “The Wealth
Are Victims of Their Own Propaganda, to escape higher taxes, they must embrace deficits,” Kelton (2019) argues that
adopting MMT thinking can provide the rich an escape from paying high taxes. On the other hand, (Kelton 2020: 25)
advocates for taxing the rich to rebalance the distribution of wealth and income and protect the health of democracy. At
best, MMT is unclear regarding its stance on the redistributive role of taxation and, at worst, defending the status-quo
through not taking a strong position.
16In capitalist and non-capitalist economies, in theory and in practice. Section 5 expands on this point.
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The international monetary system has a hierarchical and asymmetric institutional structure organized
around a key currency, the US Dollar (Andrade & Prates 2013). In this hierarchical structure, cur-
rencies are positioned according to their degree of liquidity, which reflects their ability to perform the
three functions of money on the international scale: means of payment, unit of account (denomination
of contracts), and store of value (international reserve currency) (De Paula, Fritz, & Prates 2017). The
relative size of an economy, the nature of integration with the world markets, geopolitical power, and
the willingness to internationalize the domestic currency influence the extent to which currencies can
perform these functions. The US Dollar, placed at the top of the hierarchy, is followed by currencies
of other core countries, such as the Euro and Japanese Yen. Given their inability to perform the in-
ternational money functions, currencies issued by developing nations are placed at the bottom of this
structure (ibid.)
The hierarchy among currencies engenders various challenges for developing nations. It makes them
vulnerable to capital flight and their currency markets more susceptible to the volatility of short-term
capital flows (Andrade & Prates 2013). Furthermore, the asymmetric nature of this structure makes
it challenging for most countries to borrow in domestic currencies domestically and internationally,
both in the short and long term (Hausmann & Panizza 2003). The phenomenon of foreign currency
borrowing, the ‘original sin,’ although not limited to, is overwhelmingly associated with developing
nations.
There are a few reasons why developing countries often struggle to borrow in domestic currency and
resort to borrowing in foreign currencies17. Firstly, some of the key intermediate goods, such as ma-
chinery and energy, are not always sold in domestic markets in domestic currency. As developing
countries attempt to move away from producing agricultural commodities to manufacturing goods, the
need to import capital goods, mostly from advanced economies, increases. Furthermore, technolog-
ical dependence results in a strong inelasticity of imports to growth, particularly with respect to the
capital or technology-intensive imports of intermediate goods. Given their integration into the world
economy as exporters of primary commodities and low-value-added manufacturing products, export
revenues do not typically suffice to pay for these imports. As a result, developing countries have a
structural tendency to run trade deficits and obtain foreign currency to meet their payment obligations.
This tendency for trade gaps and foreign exchange constraints have long been theorized in the classical
structuralist literature, for instance, in seminal works of Prebisch (1962) and Thirlwall (1979)18.
17Borrowing in foreign currency can be made by households, firms, or the government. Here, we refer to the borrowing
made by firms.
18The theoretical work is supported by real-world examples of how the lack of access to foreign exchange might constitute
a constraint on economic development. For instance, the difficulties and opportunities to access foreign exchange were
crucial in shaping the political economy of East Asian countries’ industrialization strategies in post-war years. See
Fischer (2018) for an in-depth analysis of the importance of overcoming foreign exchange constraints in East Asian
12
The second reason why many developing countries resort to foreign currency borrowing relates to for-
eign investors’ unwillingness to hold the currencies these economies issue19. A country can borrow in
domestic currency only as much as its lenders are willing to provide, and in the current international
system, due to the differences in the ability of different currencies to perform international money
functions, the demand for currencies other than a small number of key currencies is limited. Jeanneret
and Souissi (2016) documents that outstanding international debt securities are denominated primarily
in four currencies: the US Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the Euro, and the Japanese Yen. Eichengreen
and Hausmann (2005) similarly show that more than 90% of all international financial contracts are
denominated in five currencies. These findings are striking in the context of roughly 150 existing cur-
rencies that could alternatively be used (Fritz et al. 2018).
The concept of currency hierarchy requires that monetary returns of assets denominated in peripheral
currencies have to compensate for their lower liquidity relative to that of core currencies to induce for-
eign investors to demand such assets and to prevent capital outflows by domestic investors (De Paula
et al. 2017). This applies to sovereign bonds issued by developing nations. Furthermore, if the mar-
kets perceive an increase in government spending as a sign of a lower commitment to debt retirement,
this can result in a self-fulling expectation of exchange rate depreciation and higher long-term interest
rates. Indeed, many developing nations resort to fiscal tightening to compensate for the negative effects
of currency depreciation 20 on their fiscal balance and to inspire global investors’ confidence (ibid.) In
practice, these are reasons why interest rates are often set at higher levels in developing countries that
advanced economies, which suggests that standard Keynesian monetary tools for stimulating expan-
industrialization.
19The following statement by Wray (2015: 124) acknowledges this point “Many developing nations will not find a foreign
demand for their domestic currency liabilities. Indeed, some nations could be so constrained that they must issue liabilities
denominated in one of these more highly desired currencies in order to import. This can lead to many problems and
constraints- for example, once such a nation has issued debt denominated in a foreign currency, it must earn or borrow
foreign currency to service that debt. These problems are important and not easily resolved.”
20This raises the question ‘why not allow the depreciation?’ – a substantial literature has emerged linking real exchange rate
depreciation to long-run growth (see Demir and Razmi (2020) for a review of the literature) – but this may raise questions
about whether the real exchange rate is a target or a tool. Using fiscal policy as a tool to target full employment, it will
only be by fluke that the real exchange rate corresponding to the desired fiscal expansion is consistent with the target level
of undervaluation required by structural transformation imperatives. N targets require at least N independent instruments
(Tobin 1993). This obviously leaves room for monetary policy to pursue an exchange rate target. But MMT advocates
subordinate the role of monetary policy to financing fiscal policy, through debt-monetization. Beyond a target range,
excessive depreciation may drive inflation risks that raise contractionary concerns especially under inflation targeting
regimes. Secondly, despite these widely expected benefits of undervalued RER policies, many developing countries
pursue policies aimed at keeping their exchange rates overvalued (Steinberg 2015). By not engaging with concerns
around depreciation or undervaluation of exchange rates, MMT dismisses the reality of “fear of floating” prevalent across
many developing nations (Calvo & Reinhart 2002).
13
sion are constrained in an important sense, particularly in the absence of capital controls. This also
means that contrary to what is argued by MMT advocates, fiscal austerity is not always self-imposed;
developing countries are subject to discipline by the international financial markets.
Thirdly, the lack of development of domestic financial markets can force developing countries to bor-
row in international markets. Domestic financial markets in developing nations are often characterized
by credit constraints and higher interest rates charged on lending (De Paula et al. 2017, Bonizzi et al.
2019). These problems are exacerbated by the unwillingness of domestic private actors to borrow or
hold domestic assets and currency whose value is often volatile. These factors restrict the ability of the
financial system to provide long-term credit necessary for industrialization.
What does the structural nature of balance of payments (BoP) deficits and dependence on foreign debt
mean in practical terms for the issue at hand? Firstly, the structural nature of balance of payments
deficits and the issues of fiscal balance are interrelated. Introducing restrictions on the imports of
(luxury) consumption might be one potential way of relaxing the BoP constraints, which implies that
higher taxes might be needed. This suggests that even when operating under a floating exchange rate
regime with a convertible currency, the conduct of fiscal policy in open economies has to take the bal-
ance of payments constraints into consideration (Skott 2019).
Secondly, alongside (net) foreign debt accumulation, private and public sectors in developing nations
can be subjected to mismatches on their respective balance sheets. This problem occurs when assets
are mostly in domestic currency, whereas their liabilities are denominated in foreign currencies. When
developing countries are subject to vagaries of international capital flows and exchange rate volatility,
as is often the case in flexible exchange rate regimes, an increase in currency mismatch on balance
sheets would further increase the risk premiums.
While flexible exchange rate regimes may lessen some more immediate problems of thinking about
the relevance of MMT in developing countries, insofar as the pressure to accumulate foreign currency
to defend the integrity of the currency peg disappears, they come with their own set of challenges
and sources of instability that requires grappling with. Relying on domestic currency borrowing un-
der a flexible exchange rate system will likely devalue the domestic currency due to capital outflows
and pressures on the current account balance. To Kaboub (2007), this does not represent a problem
because developing countries will be able to import anything they want merely by offering their do-
mestic currency, and there will always be a demand for those currencies, albeit a devalued exchange
rate. However, this suggestion can have severe implications for inflation and external debt financing
(Bonizzi et al. 2019).
A decline in the value of the domestic currency will likely put upward pressure on domestic prices.
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Kaboub (2007) and Wray (2006) claim that depreciation will increase only the relative prices of com-
modities with significant import content, which they refer to as “relative price effect” rather than “in-
flation.” However, given that developing countries are often net importers of key intermediate goods,
such as capital goods and energy, which enter the production process of almost everything, a rise in
the prices of these key goods will be reflected in the overall price level. Furthermore, in the case of
continuous pressure on the exchange rate for a significant period or a rise in the overall price level trig-
gering a price-wage spiral, domestic currency financing under a flexible exchange rate regime has the
potential to trigger inflation21. The empirical evidence indicates that the effect of currency depreciation
on inflation, known as the exchange-rate pass through, tends to be stronger in developing nations than
advanced economies (Mohanty & Scatigna 2005)22. The concerns regarding the pass-through impact
is also an important reason why many developing nations adopt an asymmetric stance with respect
to their exchange rate policy whereby central banks tend to tolerate real exchange rate appreciations
by remaining inactive in the case of an appreciation while fighting against depreciation beyond some
threshold (Benlialper et al. 2017).
Secondly, the free-floating exchange rate regimes can lead to cyclical crisis given that capital flows
often follow a speculative and volatile logic that results in exchange rate volatility (Vergnhanini &
De Conti 2017). Short run capital flows constitute the primary determinant of exchange rate dynamics
in developing countries, which are shaped by expectations. Given that the currencies of developing
nations have a lower liquidity premium in relation to the key currencies, in times of increasing un-
certainty, assets denominated in these currencies become the first victims of the “flight to safety,” i.e.,
flight to assets denominated in the key currencies. On the contrary, under more promising circum-
stances, international investors tend to hold illiquid assets denominated in peripheral currencies, given
that they generate higher overall returns. The existence of a hierarchical currency structure conditions
the behavior of exchange rates because any sudden change in financing conditions in core nations or
in expectations can trigger a rapid response in exchange rates. Operating under high vulnerability to
portfolio flows and exchange rate risk, developing country government may find themselves in a posi-
tion to choose between domestic currency financing of imports or preventing the exchange rate from
collapsing (Bonizzi et al. 2019). Often, they adopt some kind of administrated exchange rates with
different degrees of intervention to avoid sudden defaults that could be caused by currency mismatches
and to avoid the inflationary pressures.
21In response to these points, some MMT scholars, such as Tymoigne and Wray (2013), advocates for exchange rate
pegging. As Vergnhanini and De Conti (2017) rightly points out, this would fully undermine one of the main conditions
of monetary sovereignty. Besides, there is great evidence indicating that pegged exchange rate regimes significantly
constrain the policy space and are subject to speculative attacks
22This difference stems mainly from a larger proportion of traded goods (particularly foodstuffs) in the households’ con-
sumption baskets observed in lower-income economies.
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Overall, MMT’s assertion that a country with a sovereign currency cannot default on its public debt
is misleading insofar as it does not take into consideration that the international demand for the assets
denominated in developing country currencies is limited and volatile. Also, developing countries have
to design their fiscal and monetary policies under the threat of capital flight, which results in the
adoption of policies that are far from being autonomous.
5 The consumption-investment trade-off
That the MMT route to development is out of keeping with development theory is illustrated by a series
of contributions to the literature going back a considerable period. The consumption-investment trade-
off has been key to influential iterations of development theory and policy for nearly a century. For
instance, Kalecki (1970) argued that making room for investment in capital-scarce economies involves
sacrificing present for future consumption, particularly restraining consumption of nonessentials out of
higher incomes through appropriate fiscal policy. Formal representations of variations of this argument
have been provided in the influential Harrod/Domar model, the Feldman/Mahalanobis model, as well
as models developed by Kalecki. In this section, we outline these models and their key conclusions.
The consumption-investment trade-off is visible in the classic Domar growth model. This is an in-
teresting feature of the model considering the purpose of the model was to extend the static insights
of Keynesian economics to a dynamic, long-run setting. The model takes both the income and the
capacity generating effects of investment into account. The demand side of the model is given by the
importance of investment and the multiplier to the determination of changes in income. Equation 1
is an identity giving potential output, κ , such that ρ is the constant capacity-capital ratio and K is the
capital stock. Equation 2 gives the change in the capital stock, by definition equal to I (investment),
equal to S at the static equilibrium, and s is the marginal propensity to save. A dot over a variable
denotes a time-derivative, a hat denotes a growth rate.
κ = ρK (1)
K˙ = I = S = sκ (2)
Equation 1 and 2 imply that along the equilibrium time path a higher accumulation rate requires a
higher marginal propensity to save, as seen in equation 3:
κˆ = Kˆ = sρ (3)
A clearer representation of the trade-off can be found in the Feldman model. Against the backdrop of
the Feldman model were the rich Soviet industrialization debates. At the inception of these debates,
Soviet industry was under strain and “the possibility of securing output increases by more intensive
utilization of available equipment was diminishing as capacity limits were approached” Erlich (1950:
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59). These challenges would be aggravated by forms of demand-side stimulus: the demise of feudal
lords post revolution freed up the use of agricultural surpluses produced by peasants to be consumed
rather than appropriated by the landlords predisposed to consuming luxury imports. Large scale un-
employment, meanwhile, was compatible with high rates of capacity utilization for the simple fact that
“[t]he total productive capacity of the then existing Russian industry and the size of its capital-making
facilities were insufficient to absorb the labor reserve which had been inherited from the agrarian struc-
ture of the old regime” (Erlich 1950: 63-64). Fixing a labor market disequilibrium of this magnitude
by “mere reliance upon the smooth movement of resources from one small section of the economy to
another and upon a more intensive utilization of them would clearly not suffice” (Erlich 1950: 77). In
short, the development challenges faced by the Soviet Union in this period, stimulating industry and
absorbing excess labor, were not problems of deficient aggregate demand or, in other words, Keynesian
in nature.
MMT-inspired development perspectives dismiss the political and economic questions central to these
debates23. Class conflict and a host of political economy issues are pushed to the periphery. Why
broach the subject of distributional conflict (in the time of Preobrazhensky, the ‘peasant question’24)
when addressing the issue of financing development, if all that is necessary is leveraging the state’s
capacity to create money? By taking this approach, Chartalists, in effect, shift the supply-side issue of
how to finance/create space for development through ‘forced savings’, penalizing luxury consumption
or otherwise into the demand-side issue by asking ‘how much should government expenditure grow to
absorb surplus labor’.
Preobrazhensky was one of the leading Soviet intellects of the early 20th century, his 1924 article “the
Fundamental Law of Socialist Accumulation” is considered to be the opening gun in the Soviet de-
bate on industrialization. For Preobrazhensky it was clear that while substantial additions to the capital
stock would have beneficial effects on future supply, there would be costs to current consumption. This
could be achieved in a regressive or progressive way. The more desirable latter way could be attained
by penalizing usury and hoarding (Erlich, 1950: 81).
The Feldman model captures some aspects of Preobrazhensky’s argument. It depicts two sectors/depart-
ments, one producing investment goods (department 1) and the other producing consumer goods (de-
partment 2). The model can be summed up in a few equations, simply derived in Domar (1957) and
re-interpreted below:
23See Mitra (1977) for a stimulating characterization of these debates.
24Financing development in a worker’s state was to be done, not through the exertion of downward pressure on wages as
in the industrial revolution, but through a pricing policy grounded in industrial monopoly – de facto taxation was to be
implemented through shifting the terms of trade (Erlich, 1950: 72-73).
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Using the simplifying assumption that the capital coefficient across each sector is v, where γ is the share
of total investment allocated to department 1 (producing investment goods), I is output of department
1, C is output of department 2 (producing consumer goods), I1 is the allocation of investment to the
investment goods sector’s capital stock and I2 the allocation to the production of consumer goods, we
have:
I =
K1
v
(4)
I1 =
γ
v
K1 (5)
I2 =
1− γ
v
K1 (6)
C =
1
v
K2 (7)
This implies:
Î = K̂1 =
I1
K1
=
γ
v
(8)
Ĉ = K̂2 =
I1
K2
=
1− γ
v
K1
K2
(9)
Using equations 8 and 9, we can obtain a differential equation for K1K2 given by equation 10:
(̂
K1
K2
) =
γ
v
− 1− γ
v
K1
K2
(10)
This equation has a stable stationary solution such that:
K1
K2
→ γ
1− γ (11)
Looking at 8 and 9, and plugging the stationary solution into the latter, the growth rate of each sector
asymptotically equals γv . Hence the model shows that the growth rate of the economy as a whole is
directly related to the allocation of the capital stock between consumption and investment. Given that
γ takes a constant value varying between 0 and 1, increasing the economy’s growth rate requires allo-
cating more resources to investment than consumption.
Kalecki (1963) similarly stressed the trade-off between growth (and thereby future consumption) and
current consumption in his various writings.
Y = I +S+C (12)
Equation 12 divides national income into three components: productive investment (I), the increase in
inventories (S), and consumption (C).
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4Y = 1
m
I−aY +uY (13)
Equation 13 establishes a relationship between the increment in national income (4Y ) and productive
investment. The first term represents the productive effects of investment, i.e., the amount by which
the national income is increased as a result of investment, where m denotes the capital-output ratio.
The second term indicates how much the national income declines due to depreciation of the existing
capital equipment, where a denotes parameter of depreciation. Finally, the last term represents the in-
crease in national income due to improvements in the utilization of equipment, such as improvements
in the organization of labor or more economical use of raw materials.
Dividing both sides by Y gives us the growth rate of national income, denoted by r. Re-arranging the
terms yields:
I
Y
= (r+a−u)m (14)
Kalecki assumes that the volume of inventories changes proportionally to the national income, i.e.
S = µ4Y . Dividing both sides of this equation by Y gives:
S
Y
=
µ4Y
Y
= µr (15)
, where µ represents the ratio between the volume of inventories and the national income (the so-called
‘average period of turnover of inventories’).
Using equations 14 and 15, the growth rate of national income can be written as:
r =
1
m+µ
I +S
Y
− m
m+µ
(a−u) (16)
Let’s denote the share of productive accumulation in total income by i= I+SY . The share of consumption
is then given by 1− i. Finally, let’s denote m+µ by k and call k the ‘capital-output ratio for total capital’
since this indicates the sum of fixed capital and inventories required to produce a unit increment in
national income. Using these notations, equation 16 can be re-written as:
r =
i
k
− m
k
(a−u) (17)
Equation 17 forms the basis of Kalecki’s discussion of economic growth in most of his writings
(Sawyer 1985). This equation can also be used to indicate the inter-generational trade-off between
growth and (immediate) consumption because holding k, m, a and u constant25, an increase in r re-
25Kalecki notes that in a capitalist system, u reflects changes in the degree to which it is possible to find a market for the
output of existing productive capabilities. On the other hand, in a socialist economy, utilization of productive capacity is
determined by planning. As such, u in a socialist economy reflects the effects of technical and organizational improve-
ments that do not require significant capital outlays and hence can be taken as constant. In our exposition of Kalecki’s
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quires a rise in i and hence a fall in the consumption to income ratio (ibid.). In other words, accelerating
the growth of national income requires a rise in the relative share of productive capital accumulation in
national income, and a concomitant decline in the share of consumption, which will adversely affect
the level of consumption in the short run.
How do these arguments relate to questions over MMT-style policies in developing countries? It
is relatively straight-forward to show, as Skott (2019) has done, that fiscal policy is relevant to the
consumption-investment trade-off. Alternatively, if fiscal policy is monetized by the central bank to
the end of absorbing surplus labor, this implies a growth in the size of the government sector scaled by
the capital stock. This must come at the expense of the rate of accumulation as shown by Skott (2019)
in a Harrodian setting.
Equation 18 is given by the standard national income identity, divided through by the capital stock.
Y
K
=
C
K
+
I
K
+
G
K
(18)
This equation can be re-written as below, where YK = σ (fixed at the ‘normal’ rate of capacity utiliza-
tion), IK = g,
G
K = θ , which is a constant determined by how many goods and services the population
determines the state should provide, and W = wealth.
g = σ − C
K
(Y,W )−θ (19)
To avoid any potential misunderstanding of equation 19, it should be noted that a lower consumption
rate or government expenditure rate does not automatically cause a higher investment rate but is instead
required to make space for more rapid accumulation. Importantly, recognition of this does not preclude
an active role for the state – in fact, upon achieving a higher warranted rate, there is a major role for
the state to induce higher rates of accumulation through industrial, trade, and monetary policies – but
this is distinct from increasing θ .
To summarize these models, they all feature capacity constraints, whether in the form of constant
capacity-capital ratios (ρ in the Domar model), capacity utilization (u in the Kalecki model), output-
capital ratio (σ in the Skott model) or constant γ lying between zero and 1 in the Feldman model.
Capacity constraints drive the trade-off between investment and other forms of aggregate demand.
6 Conclusion
As things stand, MMT does not constitute a valid approach to macroeconomic policy in a developing
country. This tradition must recognize that there are some important structural limits on fiscal and mon-
etary space of developing country governments. Further, it is necessary to identify that the challenges
model, we take u as a constant in line with the Harrodian assumption of constancy of capacity utilization in the long-run.
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of developing countries go beyond the scope of influence of standard Keynesian tools. Keynesian tools
are necessary but not sufficient for addressing growth challenges in developing countries. In this re-
spect, it is important to distinguish between policy for short-run stabilization and long-run structural
transformation. A more nuanced approach to state intervention in developing countries ought to focus
on how to conduct trade and industrial policies that create a suitable environment for industrial growth.
Recognizing and organizing against this state of affairs is the art of a long tradition of heterodox and
mainstream development thought – a tradition MMT makes little contribution to and shows no regard
for.
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